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Abstract
Community competition policy utilizes four main instruments in order to contribute to the
realization of these prerequisites: classical antitrust (prohibition of cartels and abuses of dominant
positions), merger control, supervision of enterprises entrusted with special or exclusive rights, and
State aid control. Energy liberalization requires the comprehensive use of all four instruments in
order to bring about and ensure genuine competition on the European electricity and gas markets.
It seems that energy liberalization is also unique in this regard. The close link between internal
market and competition policy in the liberalization process means that both have to be seen to-
gether. The emphasis in the following discussion will, however, be on Community competition
policy and its four instruments.
ENERGY LIBERALIZATION AND EC
COMPETITION LAW
Michael Albers*
I. THE ROLE OF EC ANTITRUST LAW
There have been fifteen national and largely isolated elec-
tricity and gas markets in the European Union ("EU") until re-
cently. Other than for coal, petrol, and nuclear energy these
markets had not been made part of the European common mar-
ket. This situation changed with the adoption of liberalization
directives for electricity1 and gas2 ("Directives") and their imple-
mentation in the year 1999 for electricity, and 2000 for gas, by
almost all fifteen Member States.' The Directives provide for the
creation of Community-wide markets for electricity and gas as
they exist already for other fuels and, indeed, almost all other
goods and services. Monopoly rights at the national level had to
be abolished, a legal framework to allow new market entry as
well as access to the networks had to be created, and consumers
had to be empowered to choose freely their suppliers through-
out the EU. Energy liberalization thus means building single Eu-
ropean electricity and gas markets out of fifteen isolated na-
tional markets through the introduction of competition between
energy suppliers for customers.
Expectations are that competitive European energy markets
will increase the efficient allocation of resources and enhance
consumer welfare. Distortions of competition between substitut-
ing fuels should come to an end. Competition among suppliers
should lead to a downward convergence of prices in Europe.
These expectations seem to be well founded in view of the posi-
tive developments for European consumers in the relatively
* Head of Unit, European Community Commission, Brussels. All views expressed
are personal. This Essay results from the Fordham Corporate Law Institute Twenty-
eighth Annual Conference in International Antitrust Law and Policy, Oct. 25-26, 2001.
1. Council Directive No. 96/92/EC, O.J. L 27/20 (Jan. 30, 1997) [hereinafter Elec-
tricity Directive].
2. Council Directive No. 98/30/EC, O.J. L 204/1 (July 21, 1998) [hereinafter Gas
Directive].
3. France has not yet implemented the Gas Directive. For a short history of energy
liberalization, see the chapter by Levasseur, in THE EC LAW OF COMPETITION 735-37
(Faull & Nikpay eds., 1999).
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short period of time since the Directives have been imple-
mented; in particular, positive price developments, which are up
to now more pronounced for electricity than for gas. Whereas
electricity prices for consumers have gone down in almost all
Member States, gas prices remained heavily influenced by oil
prices because of the gas price linkage to oil.4 Other positive
developments are the emergence of new services and offerings
(for example, power exchanges and gas spot markets). The al-
most parallel liberalization of electricity and gas markets may
mutually reinforce the respective processes. The availability of
highly efficient and environmentally friendly gas-fired power sta-
tions is likely to facilitate new entry in electricity markets,
whereas the accelerated growth of demand for gas may in turn
create additional incentives for new entry in gas markets.
It is thus hoped that energy liberalization will produce simi-
lar positive results as other previous liberalization processes,
such as in the telecommunication sector. The concrete result
will of course be energy specific and this may mean that it will
arguably only become visible in the long run given that the elec-
tricity and gas industries are characterized by large sunk costs
and longer lead and construction times than the industry aver-
ages.5 It may also be that energy liberalization will not be as ap-
pealing for European consumers as has been, for instance,
telecom liberalization through the competitive introduction of
innovative and trendy products like mobile telephony. But, of
course, you never know.
Liberalization is never launched in a "green field" situation.
Electricity and gas liberalization take place in industries that de-
veloped for decades along national lines. Moreover, the number
4. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment, Completing the Internal Energy Market, COM (2001) 125 Final, at 7-8 (Mar. 13,
2001) [hereinafter Energy Communication]; Commission Staff Working Paper, Com-
pleting the Internal Energy Market, SEC(2001) 438 (Dec. 3, 2001), at 18-26, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/library/438.pdf; 1st Benchmarking Report on the
Implementation of the Internal Electricity and Gas Market, Commission Staff Working
Paper, SEC(2001)/1957 (Mar. 12, 2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/en-
ergy/en/internal-market/library/report-en.pdf; Luis de la Fuente, Electricity Prices for
EU Industry on 1January 2000: Downward Trend, EUROSTAT, Statistics in Focus-Environ-
ment and Energy, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/Public/datashop/
print-product/EN?catalogue=Eurostat&product=KS-NQ-00-005---I-
EN&mode=download.
5. INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY & OECD, COMPETITION IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS
17-19 (2001) [hereinafter lEA].
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of electricity and gas enterprises operating in each national mar-
ket is very limited. Most of these operators enjoyed a monopoly
before liberalization and are now very often gatekeepers to the
network and the customer base. The opening-up of markets for
Community-wide competition will consequently lead to a trans-
formation of the industry from a monopolistic towards a compet-
itive structure. Given that electricity and gas have to be supplied
through a network, which will remain a natural monopoly for
most of its parts even after liberalization,6 the transformation
forms a particular challenge for both industry and public author-
ities.
The European Community disposes of a variety of policy in-
struments to commence and govern the process of liberaliza-
tion.7 The application of these instruments taking into account
the principle of subsidiarity requires the Commission, however,
to establish a consensus among all major political powers of the
Community. Each liberalization process is unique in this regard
and is built upon a specific policy mix. For the full liberalization
of the energy markets it was clear from the start that the open-
ing-up of national markets had to be accompanied by harmoni-
zation measures to be effective.' The legal basis for the Direc-
tives of 1996 and 1998 adopted by the European Parliament and
the Council, thus, form internal market rules (Article 95) and
not competition rules (Article 86). The same holds for the new
"Acceleration Directive" proposed by the Commission in March
2001, which has the objective of opening up fully the electricity
and gas markets.9 This current orientation, in principle, how-
ever, does not exclude future adoption of directives and deci-
sions on the basis of Article 86(3) by the Commission with the
aim of pushing the transformation of the industries forward or
6. See, e.g., id. at 19-20.
7. Kurt Lennart Ritter, EC Antitrust Law and Energy, in [1995] FORDHAM CORP. L.
INST. 131-37 (Barry Hawk ed.).
8. Id. at 137-42.
9. See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council amending Directives 96/92/EC and 98/30/EC concerning common rules for
the internal market in electricity and natural gas, COM(2001) 125 final, [hereinafter
Acceleration Directive], available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/en/internal-
market/library/directive enacte.pdf; Press Release, EU Commission, Towards a Single
Energy Market in 2005, IP/01/356 (Mar. 13, 2001). All non-domestic electricity and
gas customers shall enjoy free-supplier choice by 2003 and 2004 respectively. All do-
mestic consumers of electricity and gas shall freely choose consumers by 2005.
2002]
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quickly resolving specific issues that come up in the process.1 0
Community competition policy forms a cornerstone for full
and comprehensive energy liberalization, even if the key legisla-
tive measures are instituted by internal market directives. This
will be demonstrated in the following discussion of the three es-
sential prerequisites for effective competition in network indus-
tries. The three prerequisites are:
* Free consumer choice of suppliers,
* Free supply competition, and
" Open access to networks.
Community competition policy utilizes four main instruments in
order to contribute to the realization of these prerequisites:
classical antitrust (prohibition of cartels and abuses of dominant
positions), merger control, supervision of enterprises entrusted
with special or exclusive rights, and State aid control.11
Energy liberalization requires the comprehensive use of all
four instruments in order to bring about and ensure genuine
competition on the European electricity and gas markets. It
seems that energy liberalization is also unique in this regard.1 2
The close link between internal market and competition policy
in the liberalization process means that both have to be seen
together. The emphasis in the following discussion will, how-
ever, be on Community competition policy and its four instru-
ments.
II. FREE CONSUMER CHOICE OF SUPPLIERS
The first essential prerequisite for the creation of competi-
tive Community-wide electricity and gas markets is to empower
individual consumers to freely choose their energy provider
throughout the EU. The new European framework provides for
full competition with all the risks and chances for market partici-
pants engaged in the supply of commodity products. It is not
limited to periodic auctions for the supply of consumers in a
10. See Press Release, EU Commission, Commission Confirms Need to Tackle
Cross-border Investment Restrictions and Energy Market Distortions, IP/01/872 (June
20, 2001).
11. Ritter, supra note 7, at 132-37.
12. See, e.g., Herbert Ungerer, Use of EC Competition Rules in the Liberalisation of the
European Union's Telecommunications Sector, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
competition/speeches/text/sp2001 009-en.pdf.
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given area, even under the option of the "single buyer" proce-
dure as foreseen in the Electricity Directive.13
A. Gradual and Uneven Market Opening
The Directives allowed Member States, however, to opt for
the gradual opening-up of their markets. In this regard, the
Community followed the British example of electricity liberaliza-
tion." Not all consumers had to be given the right of free sup-
plier choice at once. Member States could institute a phased
process in which case they had to respect minimum opening
levels for the liberalization of demand. 5 In spite of this rather
careful approach to market opening, the Community legislator
was not able to fix a definitive date for the complete opening of
electricity and gas markets in all fifteen countries. The Direc-
tives only announce further measures to be considered after
2007 for electricity and after 2008 for gas.16
Against this background it came as a pleasant surprise that
only a minority of Member States opted for the "minimalist" ap-
proach of the Directives.17 Most Member States obviously wished
to quickly reap the benefits of liberalization and opened up their
markets fully. Some did so immediately; others will do it over a
relatively short period of time. The result was that around sixty-
six percent of European electricity demand and seventy-nine
percent of total European gas demand are now legally com-
pletely open to Community-wide competition. 8 This develop-
ment encouraged the Commission to propose the so-called Ac-
celeration Directive suggesting full market opening by 2005."9
The gradual market opening as foreseen in the Directives
creates the critical mass for initiating the transformation of the
13. Electricity Directive, supra note 1, art. 18; lEA, supra note 5, at 58 (for a
description of procurement model).
14. Ritter, supra note 7, at 142.
15. See Electricity Directive, supra note 1, art. 19(1); Gas Directive, supra note 2,
art. 18(2). Regarding electricity, Member States had to open 28% of demand in 1999,
and 35% by 2003. Regarding gas, Member States had to open a minimum of 20% of
demand in 2000, and 28% by 2003.
16. See Electricity Directive, supra note 1, art. 26; Gas Directive, supra note 2, art.
28.
17. France, however, to this date has not implemented the Gas Directive in na-
tional law.
18. Details on the market opening of each Member State can be found in the
Annex to this Essay.
19. See Acceleration Directive, supra note 9.
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industries from monopolistic to competitive markets. The fact
that large and mostly professional energy consumers become eli-
gible first to select freely their suppliers creates economic incen-
tives for the latter to compete for contracts. It also sets in mo-
tion the difficult process of developing functioning transmission
markets that previously did not exist in almost all Member
States. Finally, the gradual approach takes into account the fact
that market participants need time to adapt to the new frame-
work and to develop the tools and instruments for the proper
functioning of competitive markets.
The policy choice made by the European legislator also en-
tails risks, however, notably the risk of a lengthy transition pe-
riod with imperfect competition even in the opened market seg-
ments. It seems already apparent that full market opening from
the beginning serves consumers better in terms of price competi-
tion than phased introduction of competition.20 Of paramount
importance, however, is the risk of "imbalance" because of the
uneven opening of fifteen national markets. While in most
countries suppliers are subject to competition with their whole
customer base, in a minority of countries suppliers are still par-
tially protected against competition. Uneven market opening
thus creates competitive advantages for some and disadvantages
for others. Cross-subsidization from the captive to the competi-
tive customer groups is only one example of a competitive ad-
vantage. The possibility to cross-subsidize affects the ability of
suppliers to win customers in other geographic markets or,
worse, to defend historic market positions against new entrants.
These imbalances cannot be effectively contained by sector-
specific or competition law. It is true that the liberalization di-
rectives provide for a so-called reciprocity rule. This rule en-
ables a Member State with 100% market opening to block cer-
tain exports from a country with only minimal market opening.21
However, the reciprocity rule only deals with cross-border trade.
It does not address the other economic consequences of uneven
market opening.22 In particular, it does not address the issue of
20. See Energy Communication, supra note 4, at 7.
21. See Electricity Directive, supra note 1, art. 19(5); Gas Directive, supra note 2,
art. 19(1).
22. It may not even deal with the reciprocal trade issues effectively. See Energy
Communication, supra note 4, at 5.
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cross-border mergers and acquisitions.23 This leads to what one
might call the "EDF experience." The French power supplier EDF
belongs to the group of European companies pursuing an active
acquisition strategy throughout the Community. This caused
concerns for two reasons. Firstly, EDF originates from a Member
State with a minimalist approach to liberalization. The company
seems to take advantage of its protected home market in order
to acquire competitors active in countries with a market opening
of 100% and with a more pluralistic supply structure. Secondly,
EDF is a State-owned company, which may benefit from the fact
that its shareholders do not expect returns as high on invest-
ments as private shareholders would.
The whole liberalization process was imperiled in 2001
when two Member States made moves to freeze the voting rights
in the two power suppliers that EDF was about to take over in the
respective countries. The Commission reacted by proposing to
accelerate market opening and quickly fix a date for full liberali-
zation. 24 Only a rapid and complete opening up of energy mar-
kets for competition will effectively eliminate imbalances. To
simply enlarge the "reciprocity" rule and include cross-border
mergers and acquisitions, as has been advanced, misses the
point. Reciprocity rules neither deal with the real cause of the
imbalances nor do they remedy the competition issue. Besides,
reciprocity rules are not even compatible with existing Commu-
nity law and, more precisely, the rules on freedom of establish-
ment.
B. Locking-in of Customers
Consumers, having been legally empowered to freely
choose their supplier in the Community,25 can be impeded in
their freedom through private barriers erected by incumbent op-
erators. It has always been a principal task of Community com-
23. The most prominent case for a company with an active Europe-wide acquisi-
tion strategy in this regard is EDF, a State-owned company originating from a Member
State with a minimalist approach to liberalization. A list with its recent acquisitions in
Europe can be found in EDF/EnBW, Commission Decision, Case No. COMP/M.1853,
para. 85 (Feb. 7, 2001) (unofficial version), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m 185 3_en.pdf.
24. See Acceleration Directive, supra note 9.
25. The Directives define these consumers as "eligible customers." Electricity Di-
rective, supra note 1, art. 19; Gas Directive, supra note 2, art. 18.
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petition policy to deal with private barriers where State barriers
have been successfully abolished through internal market policy.
The process of European market integration is thus supported
by the enforcement of the competition rules.
The traditional practice of electricity and gas suppliers to
conclude exclusive long-term contracts with their customers can
have the effect of a private barrier to the free choice of consum-
ers.26 Exclusive purchasing agreements on a long-term basis may
violate the competition rules, in particular if the supplier enjoys
market power. A dominant supplier has a special responsibility
not to impair emerging competition. 7 If a dominant firm
obliges customers to purchase exclusively from the firm on a
long-term basis, competition from actual and potential competi-
tors is impeded. This commercial practice constitutes an abuse
of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 82 if it ties
a substantial proportion of demand, unless the dominant firm
can objectively justify the practice. 28 Ties constitute an abuse ir-
respective of whether exclusivity is stipulated without further
qualification or whether it is undertaken in consideration of the
grant of a rebate.2 9 Since exclusive long-term contracts are the
exception rather than the rule on competitive markets with suffi-
cient liquidity as can already be observed on effectively liberal-
ized markets, this commercial practice is prima facie not objec-
tivelyjustified. It is therefore one of the priorities of Community
competition policy to pursue such exclusionary conduct of for-
mer monopolists on liberalized markets. This can be demon-
strated by the example of the Gas Natural/Endesa case.
The former Spanish gas monopolist Gas Natural concluded
a long-term gas supply contract with the leading Spanish electric-
ity generator Endesa that covered basically all of its gas require-
ments for the foreseeable future and thereafter in accordance
26. See Exxon/Mobil, Commission Decision, Case No. IV/M.1383, paras. 59, 95
(Sept. 29, 1999) (unofficial version), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/compe
tition/mergers/cases/decisions/m 1 383_en.pdf.
27. See NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin (Michelin) v. Comm'n, Case
322/81, [19831 E.C.R. 3461, para. 57.
28. Commission Notice, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ. C 291/1 (2000),
para. 107, [hereinafter VRG]; BPB Indus. PLC & British Gypsum Ltd. (BPB) v.
Comm'n, Case T-65/89, [1993] E.C.R. 11-389, para. 68.
29. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Comm'n, Case 85/76, [1979] E.C.R. 461,
para. 89. The use of an English clause or of fidelity rebates constitutes a per se violation
for dominant firms. See VRG, supra note 28, para. 152.
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with its perceived share of Spanish power production. Potential
entrants to the Spanish gas market were thereby losing an attrac-
tive client, as electricity generators belong to the large volume
consumers of gas. After the parties had been informed of the
Commission's competition concerns, they modified their con-
tract in terms of volume and duration. The volume purchased
was reduced to the extent necessary to ensure, on the one hand,
that Endesa would remain an attractive client in volume terms
for new market entrants. On the other hand, Endesa's mini-
mum requirements for the supply of the new power stations it
intended to build were respected. The duration of the contract
was substantially shortened thereby taking into account that En-
desa would still have to build the power stations for which it
purchases the gas.3 °
It should be underlined that the Commission vigorously
pursues exclusionary conduct towards all eligible customers
within the meaning of the Directives whenever it is brought to its
attention. This includes industrial consumers like power genera-
tors and traders where they are admitted as well as distributors.3 '
Otherwise, their legal empowerment remains without practical
effect and they cannot benefit from liberalization. Community
competition policy thus contributes to ensure free consumer
choice on electricity and gas markets that forms one of the three
prerequisites for effective competition.
III. FREE SUPPLY COMPETITION
The second essential prerequisite is free supply competi-
tion. The Directives provide in this regard a general obligation
for Member States to create a new legal framework for the elec-
tricity and gas markets with "a view to achieving a competitive
30. See EU COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT: XXXTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
154-55 (2000); Press Release, EU Commission, Commission Closes Investigation on
Spanish Gas Company Gas Natural, IP/00/297 (Mar. 27, 2001); Mariano Fernandez
Salas, Long-Term Supply Agreements In The Context Of Gas Market Liberalisation: Commission
Closes Investigation Of Gas Natural, 2 EC COMPETITION POL'Y NEWSL. 55 (2000), available
at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/newsle/en/index.htm.
31. Member States are entitled to exclude electricity traders from authorization on
their territory. Electricity Directive, supra note 1, art. 17(1). Distributors are at least
eligible customers themselves insofar as they supply eligible customers. Electricity Di-
rective, supra note 1, art. 19(3); Gas Directive, supra note 2, art. 18(8).
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market."3 2 This led in practice to the abolition of monopoly
rights, in particular monopoly import and export rights. The
fifteen national electricity and gas markets are now open for
trade. In addition, special or exclusive rights of incumbent en-
ergy suppliers had either to be lifted or modified by Member
States in order to allow for competition. The grant of special or
exclusive rights is closely linked to the provision of public ser-
vices, for example, the right of final consumers to be connected
to and supplied by the grid. Since the issue of public service
obligations concerns not only suppliers but also network opera-
tors, it will be discussed separately below. 33
The Directives deal with the issue of supply competition not
only in a general clause but also through the explicit regulation
of new market entry. They stipulate that new entry must be per-
mitted under the transparent, objective, and non-discriminatory
terms of an authorization procedure.3 4 Thus, the Directives cre-
ate the fundamental conditions for supply-side competition be-
tween incumbent operators as well as between incumbents and
new market entrants. Electricity and gas liberalization, however,
has not been launched in a "greenfield" situation. The existing
monopolistic supply situation will not evolve overnight into a
competitive market structure.
A. Electricity
Many electricity markets in the fifteen Member States have
been dominated by a generation monopoly before liberalization.
Almost all national markets have been characterized by monopo-
listic supply areas.
The majority of suppliers active on the various national mar-
kets are vertically integrated transmission system operators and
thus control the access to their traditional supply area. New
market entry through the construction of power plants is gener-
32. Electricity Directive, supra note 1, art. 3(1); Gas Directive, supra note 2, art.
3(1).
33. See infra Part V.
34. See Electricity Directive, supra note 1, art. 4 (generation); Gas Directive, supra
note 2, art. 4 (gas supply). Regarding electricity, Member States could also opt in favor
of a tendering procedure instead of authorization; however, only one Member State
did. See Acceleration Directive, supra note 9, new art. 5 (proposing to render the au-
thorization procedure obligatory).
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ally facilitated by new production technology35 and the parallel
liberalization of gas markets. These positive factors have to be
balanced against the slow growth of consumption, existing over-
capacity of generation in many Member States, and the persist-
ing market dominance of the former legal monopolists, which
probably discourage new entry. Import competition would thus
seem to be the most promising source of supply competition at
least in the shorter term. The sometimes very different price
levels of the various national markets, which among other
things, are being caused by the different fuel mix of generators,
create a powerful incentive for trade. However, the grids of only
a few Member States are sufficiently interconnected to allow for
the rapid development of real cross-border markets or, at least,
for substantial trade flows with an impact on the market conduct
of incumbent suppliers. 6
In view of this situation, which is not conducive to effective
supply competition, many Member States have not only imple-
mented the provisions of the Directive but also engaged in the
further re-organization of their domestic markets. Two ap-
proaches have become apparent. Some countries have been
splitting up their power generation monopoly into several inde-
pendent entities (mostly Member States with large domestic
markets and State-owned generation) and have organized mar-
ket places for the wholesale of electricity, for instance, through
the creation of pools.3 7 Other Member States opted for a "mar-
ket expansion approach"38 and created jointly through regula-
tion larger geographical markets and thus increased the number
of suppliers.39 Most Member States, however, rely on market
forces and the emergence of the internal Community market to
develop genuine competition among electricity suppliers
(among these are many countries with small domestic markets).
Although Community competition law does not allow the
Commission to break up generation and supply monopolies
without a violation of a competition rule, it can contribute to the
amelioration of supply competition and the enlargement of mar-
35. lEA, supra note 5, at 19.
36. See infra Part IV.
37. See CEPR, A EUROPEAN MARKET FOR ELEcTRiciTv? 89-115, 164-80 (1999)
(describing the UK and Spanish markets).
38. Id. at 229.
39. See, e.g., id. at 116-96.
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kets. For example, there are generators that were forced before
liberalization to sell all their electricity to the operator entrusted
with statutory monopoly rights. These generators are very often
still linked to former monopolists through long-term contracts,
even after they have become competitors through liberalization.
The former French legal monopoly EDF entertained such a rela-
tionship with Compagnie Nationale du Rh6ne ("CNR"). This
company is a significant French producer of hydropower that
remained economically independent after the nationalization of
the French power industry some fifty years ago. The Commis-
sion took up the case and succeeded in cutting the contractual
links so that CNR is required to gradually assume the sales func-
tion itself and enter into actual competition with EDF for cus-
tomers.40
Community competition law also comes into play in the re-
structuring process of the European power industry through
mergers, acquisitions, and the formation ofjoint ventures. Many
of these transactions are pro-competitive when they lead, for ex-
ample, to new entry in product or geographic markets.4' When-
ever a transaction has an impact on the market position of a for-
mer statutory monopolist, however, the competition effects have
to be assessed very carefully. The Commission then has to ex-
amine the concrete state of development of the liberalized sup-
ply and transmission markets as well as the possibilities and like-
lihood of new market entry. In doing so, the Commission ap-
plies a dynamic approach. Foreseeable and imminent
improvements of the conditions for competition as well as sub-
stantial remedies offered by the merging parties in order to ei-
ther eliminate or compensate for negative competition effects
are considered and may lead to the approval of an operation
that would have been prohibited under a static view of existing
market conditions and positions. This can be illustrated with the
examples of the VEBA/VIAG and EDF/EnBW cases.
40. The case began as an antitrust procedure but was concluded in the merger
procedure. See infra note 47.
41. See EDF/London Electricity, Commission Decision, Case No. IV/M.1346, OJ.
C 92/10 (1999) (Jan. 1, 1999); ENDESA/CDF/SNET, Commission Decision, Case No.
COMP/M.2281, O.J. C 179/09 (2001) (Apr. 17, 2001); RWE/Karntner Energie, Com-
mission Decision, Case No. COMP/M.2513, OJ. C 286/03 (2001) (Aug. 2, 2001).
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The first case, VEBA/VIAG ,42 concerns the merger of two
leading energy companies active on the already concentrated
German power market with eight generators holding a com-
bined market share of ninety percent. In its competition assess-
ment, the Commission regarded the entire territory of Germany
as the relevant market, although many suppliers still largely limit
their activities to their previously protected monopoly supply ar-
eas. The Commission took a dynamic view of market develop-
ment because the essential requirement for the nation-wide sale
of electricity, the ground rules for third-party access to all net-
works, albeit still imperfect, had been adopted.
The Commission established that the consolidation would
significantly increase concentration and create a dominant du-
opoly of two generators controlling sixty-eight percent of sup-
plies. Underlying market conditions such as the homogeneity of
the product, the transparency of the market, and the limited
growth in demand would favor parallel behavior of the two
members of the duopoly. Of particular relevance were the nu-
merous corporate links between them and with other competi-
tors. In addition, the Commission found that the German sys-
tem of negotiated third-party access to the grid gave the duopoly
members competitive advantages over competitors.44
In order to avoid a prohibition of their envisaged transac-
tion, the parties offered to the Commission a number of com-
mitments with the aim to remedy the established competition
problems. Firstly, the companies undertook to reduce the cor-
porate interrelationships between them. This undertaking elimi-
nated the grounds for a common interest of the market leaders
in peaceful parallel behavior and removed a tool for privileged
access to information about the corporate strategy of the other
member of the duopoly. At the same time these divestitures
would have the positive effect of rendering a joint venture,
called VEAG, which would otherwise been jointly controlled by
the duopolists, a new independent competitor with significant
competitive potential. Apart from these undertakings, the enter-
prises also committed themselves to less conventional remedies
42. See Commission Decision, Case No. COMP/M.1673, O.J. L 188/1 (2001)
[hereinafter VEBA/VIAG].
43. Id. at 5-7, paras. 32-46.
44. Id. at 11-26.
2002]
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and undertook, for instance, to drop the t-component surcharge
for certain power transmissions within Germany that adversely
affected competition from traders and smaller generators.4" An-
other example of an unusual commitment is the undertaking of
the merger partners to issue separate bills for network charges
and energy prices in order to increase price transparency for
their customers and to inhibit any cross-subsidization by the net-
work monopoly in favor of the power sales department being
under competitive pressure.46 The Commission regarded these
commitments together as sufficient to remove the competition
concerns arising out of the envisaged consolidation and allowed
it consequently to go ahead.
The second case, EDF/EnBW, concerned the acquisition of a
potential competitor from another Member State by a former
national monopolist. EDF, the leading electricity generator in
France, intended to acquire EnBW, a member of the group of
the four largest German generators that had been formed after
the already mentioned VEBA/VIAG merger.47 The Commission
found that the target company, which has its historic supply area
adjacent to the French-German border, was one of the few po-
tential entrants particularly well placed to enter the French mar-
ket. EnBW had an incentive to enter at a significant scale and,
indeed, the company had already participated in tenders
launched by French eligible customers, through a Swiss genera-
tion subsidiary.48 Furthermore, it was established that EDF
would become in general less exposed to competition in France
after the acquisition. It would be in a position to use its presence
in Germany to deter its rivals from pursuing aggressive competi-
tion in the French market. Moreover, it would control a large
part of the Swiss generation and supply of peak load, the access
of which is not only important for EDF itself, but also for its com-
petitors on the French market. Finally, through the entry into
the German market, EDF would further strengthen its already
45. See infra Part IV.A.
46. See VEBA/VIAG, supra note 42, at 38-41.
47. See EDF/EnBW, Commission Decision, Case No. COMP/M.1853 (Feb. 7,
2001) (unofficial version), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/merg-
ers/cases/decisions/m1853_en.pdf
48. Approximately 30% of French consumption or 1,206 company sites are open
for competition. Id. para. 14.
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outstanding position as a pan-European supplier of large busi-
ness customers with production sites all over Europe.
The Commission approved the envisaged transaction only
after EDF had made several major commitments. Of particular
interest is the innovative commitment to make available to its
competitors, via auctions, access to generation capacities located
in France, which amount to thirty to thirty-two percent of the
national market for eligible customers. It was the prognosis of
the Commission that access to virtual power plants in France will
facilitate foreign suppliers to become active on the French mar-
ket and improve their potential to conclude pan-European sup-
ply contracts. German suppliers especially will be in a position
to gain a foothold and will thus be able to cope with EDF's in-
creased retaliation potential after the acquisition. EDF will also
divest the Swiss generation subsidiary of the target company in
order to avoid any improvement of EDF's access to Swiss peak
supplies. The EDF/EnBW case demonstrates that even a former
monopolist can expand through acquisitions and thus try to
make good on other markets any losses of revenues in the tradi-
tional sales area.
The Commission is not only concerned about the elimina-
tion of new entry by competitors from neighboring markets. It
aims also at protecting ex novo entry through new power genera-
tion. Gas is one of the energy sources from which electricity will
increasingly be produced in the future because of its economic
and environmental advantages. It is expected that the growth of
the gas market in the next decade will to a considerable extent
be driven by the use of gas as a fuel for electricity generation."
A merger between the dominant electricity supplier and the
dominant gas wholesaler, both active on the same geographic
market, may thus allow the electricity supplier to gain control
over one of the most important sources of competition for the
electricity supply market. The Commission has already inter-
vened twice against transactions threatening to foreclose access
of new entrants to the gas market.50
49. See Directorate-General for Energy, Economic Foundations for Energy Policy, Spe-
cial Issue, ENERGY IN EUROPE, at 27, 98 (Dec. 1999), available at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/energy/library/executive-sum.pdf.
50. See Tractebel/Distrigaz, Commission Decision, Case No M.418, paras. 47-49
(Sept. 1, 1994); Neste/IVO, Commission Decision, Case No. IV/M.931, paras. 47-61
(June 2, 1998), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/
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Other competitive advantages that a dominant supplier en-
deavors to obtain through a merger may also trigger the Com-
mission's attention. For example, the leading French supplier
EDF envisaged forming ajoint venture for the trade of electricity
and other forms of energy with a well-established trading com-
pany. France had not implemented the liberalization Directive
at the time of the formal notification of the joint venture. The
conditions and terms of third-party access to the French electric-
ity grid as well as the identity of eligible customers in France
were not known. EDF would not only have been the sole elec-
tricity generator but also the only energy trader in France until
the effective opening up of the French market. The company
would thus have been able to gain a significant first mover ad-
vantage over its competitors that were still barred from entry. In
order to avoid a prohibition decision, EDF had to concede to the
Commission that it would offer energy trading services in France
only after the market has really been opened up for competi-
tors.5 This case shows that even a dynamic approach, which
takes into account all short-term improvements of the current
market situation reaches its limits under EC merger control
where the date of entry into force of the new legal framework is
not known.
Finally, the emergence of supply competition on electricity
can also be impeded by the grant of State aid. The control of
financial aid given to enterprises by Member States is therefore
another important instrument of Community competition policy
in the liberalization context. A particular issue is the grant of
State aid to compensate companies for so-called "stranded
costs."52 Prior to market opening, some electricity undertakings,
at times under the direction of the State, invested in assets or
entered into contracts, which may prove to be unprofitable.
However, the existence of a fixed tariff established by the State
decisions/m93I_en.pdf. An additional ground for the intervention in these caseg was
that the dominant electricity producer would be able to influence the choice of indus-
trial consumers whether to engage in own-production of electricity or to continue
purchasing from the incumbent. Id.
51. EDF/Louis Dreyfus, Commission Decision, Case No. COMP/M.1557 (Sept. 28,
1999), O.J. C 323, at 11 (Nov. 11, 1999), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/com-
petition/mergers/cases/decisions/m 1557_fr.pdf.
52. The Electricity Directive also provides for transitional measures if a Member
State sees difficulties arising for its electricity industry in the timely implementation of
all obligations for market opening. See Electricity Directive, supra note 1, art. 24.
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gave them the assurance that these investments or contracts
would be financed by their customers. Following the opening of
the electricity sector for competition and the drop in electricity
prices, some of these investments and contractual commitments
may lose all prospects of being recovered-they become
"stranded."
The Commission currently is investigating a series of cases
where Member States set up aid schemes for electricity suppli-
ers.53 It acknowledges in principle that stranded costs may ap-
preciably affect the competitiveness of companies and considers
that State aid that merely compensates stranded costs for a cer-
tain period of time may be authorized under the EC Treaty (Ar-
ticle 87) in circumstances where such aid favors the transition of
its beneficiary to competitive markets. It must be assured, how-
ever, that the financial support really is limited to what is neces-
sary to compensate for stranded investments. Otherwise, the dis-
tortion of competition would not be acceptable. In addition, the
methods of financing aid intended to offset stranded costs cho-
sen by Member States must not have the effect of deterring new
market entry. For instance, aid should not be recouped from
levies on cross-border transmissions of electricity. This would
only have the detrimental effect of creating another hurdle for
import competition. A methodology for the analysis of the com-
patibility of such State aid has been elaborated by the Commis-
sion in cooperation with the Member States and was recently
adopted.54 It will guide Member States when adopting aid
schemes and allow the Commission to coherently analyze the
cases already under investigation.
The control of public support schemes always requires the
qualification of the support as State aid within the meaning of
the EC Treaty. Recently the European Court of Justice had to
deal with this problem in the context of a certain German act,
53. The Commission is analyzing cases related to Belgium, Denmark, Germany,
Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The Austrian, Dutch, Spanish, and British cases
have recently been concluded. The decisions are available at http:// europa.eu.int/
comm/secretariat general/sgb/state aids/industry. See also Press Release, EU Commis-
sion, Commission Gives Green Light to "Stranded Costs" Compensation by Spain, Aus-
tria and the Netherlands, IP/01/1079 (July 25, 2001).
54. See Press Release, EU Commission, Commission Adopts Document on "Meth-
odology for State Aid Linked to Stranded Costs" in the Electricity Sector, IP/01/1077
(July 25, 2001).
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the so-called Stromeinspeisungsgesetz.55 This law foresaw that en-
ergy companies-irrespective of whether they are private or pub-
lic-had to buy "green electricity" at fixed prices exceeding mar-
ket prices. The financial assistance was thus not handed out by
the State but by companies. The Court ruled that the scheme
did not constitute State aid as long as the company obliged to
buy green electricity is a private one, which was the case in the
matter before the Court. The Commission is at present examin-
ing the precise consequences of this decision for its State aid
policy. The issue of stranded costs shows that the Commission
actively and comprehensively applies all instruments of Commu-
nity competition policy in order to improve the conditions for
free supply competition on European electricity markets.
B. Gas
The pre-liberalization situation for supply competition on
gas markets in the fifteen Member States is in many respects very
similar to that of electricity. Gas is, however, a natural resource
not found in every Member State. The EU as a whole is a net
importer of gas. Since almost all Member States import gas, gas
production markets have always had a wider than a national di-
mension.
Gas fields are mostly developed jointly by several companies.
Joint development is very often coupled with joint selling. Some
gas exporting countries favor the joint selling of all gas produced
on their territory. Producers form the top of the "gas column. 56
They sell traditionally to one importer or import organization
per Member State. Importers are regularly vertically integrated
transmission companies and also take care of transport of the
purchased gas over long distances through high-pressure pipe-
lines; at least once it has reached the border of their Member
State.5 7 There, importers sell the gas on to power generators,
regional and local distributors, and industrial customers. Dis-
tributors are, again, vertically integrated with a distribution net-
work operator, which transmits the gas to the final consumers.
Distributors may be separate and independent from importers.
They are, however, as the other members of the vertical chain,
55. See PreussenElektra AG v. Schleswag AG, Case C-379/98, [2001] E.C.R. 1-2099.
56. See Exxon/Mobil, supra note 26, paras. 48-51.
57. Some importers are also vertically integrated gas producers.
ENERGY LIBERALIZATION
closely linked to importers through long-term supply contracts.
There existed little, if any, "gas-to-gas" competition within the
vertical chain led by an importer. Indeed, like in the electricity
sector .most gas companies enjoyed a monopoly in their histori-
cal supply area. Each vertical chain operated in isolation from
parallel chains in other Member States before liberalization.58
The isolation of the national supply chains forms a stark contrast
to the fact that approximately fifty percent of all gas consumed
in the EU crosses at least one border. After liberalization, new
entry is attracted by the high growth potential of gas consump-
tion and significant possibilities for price arbitrage, but impeded
by the insufficient liquidity of the downstream supply markets
and the long-standing supply relationships between producers
and importers upstream.
Member States are generally taking lesser measures to im-
prove the conditions for competition on gas supply markets than
they have been engaged in the organization of electricity mar-
kets. Some have introduced gas release programs (i.e., gas pur-
chased under long-term contracts from producers is transferred
to interested wholesalers), capped the market share of the in-
cumbent importer, or have done both. Most Member States
rely, as for electricity, on market forces and the internal market
to bring about effective competition.
Community competition policy contributes to the develop-
ment of gas-to-gas competition at a Community-wide scale
through a review of the contractual arrangements at all levels of
the supply chain. One particular focus of enforcement activity is
the joint selling agreements between gas producers. Technical
and commercial constraints do not seem prima facie to require
joint selling. Import monopolies are no longer justified, even if
they may have been a valid justification under the competition
rules.
The Commission therefore had serious doubts whether to
exempt from the prohibition of Article 81 (1) the envisaged col-
laboration of owners of a newly discovered gas field west of Ire-
land in the Atlantic. The parties decided subsequently to with-
58. The gas market is not equally developed in all countries. In Greece and Portu-
gal, for instance, a natural gas industry is only emerging. This explains why these coun-
tries have been given special derogations from the obligations of the Directive. See Gas
Directive, supra note 2, art. 26(2).
2002]
928 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 25:909
draw the notification of their intended joint selling agreement
and declared that they would market their gas separately.59 Fur-
thermore, the Commission initiated formal proceedings against
the participants of the Norwegian Gas Negotiation Committee
("GFU"). The organization was created in the early 1980s and
was in charge of negotiating all contracts with European import-
ers for the supply of gas produced by some twenty companies on
the Norwegian Continental Shelf. It was the GFU that decided
who could buy Norwegian gas and under what conditions. The
Commission considered the GFU to be a cartel falling under the
prohibition of Article 81(1). It is true that the Norwegian State
was closely involved in the organization of Norwegian gas explo-
ration and production. The State was aware of the existence of
the GFU and supported it to a certain degree. It remains to be
seen, however, to what extent the involvement of the State and
the State interest in the management of natural resources con-
travenes or mitigates the Commission's initial assessment of the
GFU falling under the cartel prohibition as claimed by the Nor-
wegian gas producers.
The Commission initiated formal proceedings even after
the Norwegian government announced that the GFU would be
abolished. The abolishment of the GFU may have a very positive
effect on competition among gas producers for future gas sales.
The activity of the GFU in the past, however, probably will have a
long-lasting adverse effect well into the future that may have to
be addressed as well. 60
The aim of the on-going Commission review of horizontal
arrangements among gas producers clearly is to put an end to
the tradition of artificially reducing the number of independent
players through joint selling arrangements. Price fixing is con-
sidered one of the most harmful restrictions of competition
under Community competition law and is therefore almost al-
ways prohibited.61
Another focus of enforcement activity concerns arrange-
ments that restrict cross-border competition between the mem-
59. See Press Release, EU Commission, Enterprise Oil, Statoil and Marathon to
Market Irish Corrib Gas Separately, IP/01/578 (Apr. 20, 2001).
60. See Press Release, EU Commission, Commission Objects to GFUJoint Gas Sales
in Norway, IP/01/830 (June 13, 2001).
61. See Commission Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty
to horizontal cooperation agreements, O.J. C 3/2 (2001), para. 25.
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bers of the vertical gas supply chain existing in each Member
State. A series of pending cases concerns direct territorial sales
restrictions. These restrictions have been found in long-term
supply contracts between producers and European importers. A
so-called destination clause prevents the importer from reselling
the purchased gas outside his traditional supply area, normally
being the Member State in which he is located. Its main pur-
pose seems to be to protect the pricing formula for gas called
the "market value principle." According to this principle, the
gas is priced differently depending on the alternative energy
sources available to gas buyers in each individual Member
State.62 Since producers agree to discount from the market
value price the costs of bringing their gas to the country of con-
sumption (net-back),6 they have their own interest in maintain-
ing the clause.
The clause is directly opposed to the internal market goal of
the Community and is considered to be a "hard core" restriction
of competition.6 4 The measure has the object and effect of seg-
regating the fifteen national markets and maintaining prevailing
price differences. There is no doubt, the destination clause is
void under Article 81 and its observance may be pursued with
fines (Article 15, Regulation 17). Given the absolute incompati-
bility of territorial sales restrictions with the internal market
goal, the Commission will of course also pursue all indirect mea-
sures aimed at inducing a gas purchaser not to re-sell to custom-
ers outside his traditional supply territory, such as refusal or re-
duction of bonuses or discounts.6 5 The Commission is aware of
other restrictions of effective gas-to-gas competition within the
vertical supply chain. It may have to tackle these one by one in
collaboration with national competition authorities in order to
bring about a change to what seems to be the commercial tradi-
tions of the sector.
Another example of the limitation on supply competition is
use restrictions. It was established that a dominant gas importer
imposed use restrictions in a sales contract with an electricity
62. Exxon/Mobil, supra note 26, paras. 52, 62.
63. Id. para. 101.
64. See VRG, supra note 28, para. 49.
65. Id. See Volkswagen AG v. Commission, Case T-62/98 [2000] E.C.R. 11-2707
(July 6, 2000); Glaxo Wellcome, Commission Decision, Case No. COMP/36.957, May 8,
2001, OJ. L. 302/1 (Nov. 17, 2001).
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generator. The generator was only allowed to use the purchased
gas for power production. He was neither permitted to sell the
gas to final consumers through his own gas distribution network,
nor was he allowed to sell it to other industrial consumers. The
Commission intervened against the use restriction. It consid-
ered the restraint to constitute an abuse of a dominant position
because it enables the supplier to practice price discrimination
in accordance with the demand flexibility of his various cus-
tomer groups. Moreover, use restrictions artificially reduce mar-
ket liquidity when a generator does not require all gas purchased
for power production. The restraint thus forms an obstacle to
the development of gas spot markets. 66
The emergence of effective gas-to-gas competition can fi-
nally be hampered by mergers and acquisitions. The Commis-
sion therefore took care that the take-over of Mobil by Exxon
did not produce negative competition effects. The transaction
mainly had an impact on the global oil and gas sectors, of
course. However, it also affected the downstream gas markets in
the Netherlands and Germany. Both markets are characterized
by a supply structure that was not very favorable for competition
even before the intended operation. The Dutch wholesale mar-
ket was dominated by a single company, whereas the German
market was controlled by a narrow oligopoly. Exxon was indi-
rectly active on both markets through major equity stakes in the
market leaders. In contrast, Mobil was one of the few outsiders
with a certain competitive potential because of its own gas pro-
duction and not yet fully committed reserves. The take-over
would have diminished if not completely eliminated the compet-
itive potential of Mobil and thus resulted in the strengthening of
the dominant incumbents to which Exxon belonged.67 The
merger parties agreed therefore with the Commission to re-es-
tablish the status quo ante on the Dutch market and sell Mobil's
Dutch gas business to an interested third party. The remedy for
the competition problem on the German market consisted in
the divestiture of one of Exxon's stake holdings in a German
wholesaler that compensated for the loss of competition through
the integration of Mobil's gas business.6"
66. See Commission Closes Investigation on Spanish Gas Company Gas Natural,
supra note 30.
67. Exxon/Mobil, supra note 26, paras. 205-23, 230-58.
68. Id. paras. 828-34.
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In the case of the gas supply markets, at present the transi-
tion from monopoly to competition is mainly accompanied by
the two instruments of EC antitrust rules and merger control.
The success of the transition seems to depend to a significant
extent on the successful transformation of the gas column into a
supply chain where each member is free to compete with other
members at all levels and throughout the Community. Free sup-
ply competition (the second prerequisite for effective competi-
tion on the European electricity and gas markets) is obviously
much more difficult to accomplish than the first prerequisite
(free consumer choice of suppliers).
IV. OPEN ACCESS TO NETWORKS
The third prerequisite for effective competition concerns a
particular feature of the electricity and gas sector: the network.
Deliveries of electricity and gas are effectuated through an en-
ergy-transmitting network connecting suppliers with their cus-
tomers. Most components of the electricity grid and gas pipe-
line systems constitute natural monopolies because their dupli-
cation would be inefficient due to the large fixed costs of the
investment. 69 Open access to the network for suppliers and con-
sumers is thus essential for free supply competition and free con-
sumer choice of suppliers. Similarly, exporters and their cus-
tomers must have open access to the lines connecting distinct
networks of different Member States. y0
The Directives oblige Member States accordingly to open
up all existing networks for suppliers and eligible customers lo-
cated "either inside or outside the territory covered by the inter-
connected system."7 ' Most countries created a regulated system
of access procedure (so-called regulated third-party access
("TPA")), granting users a right of access on the basis of pub-
lished tariffs approved by a regulatory authority.7 2 Since in al-
69. IEA, supra note 5, at 19-20.
70. For electricity these cross-border lines are called interconnectors. See Electric-
ity Directive, supra note 1, art. 2, at 10.
71. Id. art. 17; Gas Directive, supra note 2, arts. 15, 16.
72. See Electricity Directive, supra note 1, art. 17(4); Gas Directive, supra note 2,
art. 16. Some Member States opted for the alternative system of negotiated third-party
access-also permitted by the Directives. This trend was more pronounced for gas than
for electricity. Electricity Directive, supra note 1, art. 17(1); Gas Directive, supra note 2,
art. 15. The Commission proposes in the Acceleration Directive to admit in future
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most all Member States network operators are vertically inte-
grated with electricity or gas supply businesses, the opening of
networks for all interested users means that operators have to
give access not only to their network but de facto also to their
traditional customer base for the supply of electricity or gas.
This creates a risk of discrimination in favor of their own supply
interests whenever an operator receives an access request.
The Community legislator was aware of the discrimination
risk and obliged vertically integrated electricity and gas enter-
prises therefore to "unbundle" their network from supply inter-
ests. Unbundling means separation of accounts, 73 creation of
"Chinese Walls" to preserve the confidentiality of commercially
sensitive information of network users" and, for electricity net-
works, the separation of management through designation of a
system operator who acts independently from supply interests. 75
The Directives obviously fall short of ordering ownership
unbundling of the network. Instead network operators are
obliged not to discriminate in favor of their or their sharehold-
ers' supply interests when dealing with third-party access re-
quests.76 The observance of this non-discrimination obligation
has to be monitored by a competent and independent "dispute
settlement" authority established in each Member State.7 7
Most Member States in practice have gone further than the
Directives and have required legal or ownership separation.78
From a competition policy point of view, further unbundling
than that foreseen by the Directives would seem to be not only
appropriate but also necessary. Behavioral obligations and regu-
latory supervision arguably are always second best to structural
separation in order to effectively eliminate economic incentives
for discrimination. Stricter unbundling appears all the more ap-
propriate if it is true that the loss of economies of vertical inte-
regulated third-party access ("TPA") only. See Acceleration Directive, supra note 9, new
art. 16.
73. See Electricity Directive, supra note 1, art. 14; Gas Directive, supra note 2, art.13.
74. See Electricity Directive, supra note 1, arts. 9, 12; Gas Directive, supra note 2,
arts. 8, 11.
75. See Electricity Directive, supra note 1, arts. 7, 10.
76. See id. arts. 7(5), 11(2); Gas Directive, supra note 2, arts. 7(2), 10(2).
77. See Electricity Directive, supra note 1, art. 20; Gas Directive, supra note 2, art.
21.
78. This has been more pronounced in electricity than in gas.
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gration is small in the electricity and gas industries.79 The Com-
mission has recently proposed to go one step further and make
the legal separation of network and supply interests compul-
sory.8° It acknowledges that ownership separation would lead to
"a more rapid and equitable development of an effective inter-
nal market." The Commission intends however to further moni-
tor whether "effective and non-discriminatory access develops"
under legal unbundling before it will consider complete un-
bundling.8"
A. Development of Transmission Tariff
Community competition policy applies its legal instruments
to effectively ensure open access to networks for suppliers and
consumers. In particular, the EC antitrust rules are enforced to
deal with the two principal issues of exploitative conduct of net-
work monopolies and discriminatory practices of vertically inte-
grated network operators.
One of the major issues has been the development of fair
tariffs for the provision of transmission services to third parties.
Before liberalization, transmission in almost all Member States
was an internal transaction within the same firm or was not even
regarded to be an activity separate from energy supply. To estab-
lish a price and terms for the use of networks therefore has been
of paramount importance for the introduction of supply compe-
tition. The Commission has contributed to the tariff develop-
ment through the creation of regulatory fora where national reg-
ulatory authorities, industry participants, and other interested
parties are discussing methods to calculate appropriate tariffs
and measures to organize the cross-border transmission of elec-
tricity and gas.8 2 When necessary the Commission has also inter-
vened on the basis of competition law against tarification systems
that are discriminatory, not cost-reflective, or both.
The German network operators, for example, decided to in-
troduce a tariff for electricity transmissions, which among other
factors, was based on the distance between the feed-in point of
79. lEA, supra note 5, at 25-26.
80. See Acceleration Directive, supra note 9, new art. 10(4).
81. Id. at 6. The proposal is explicitly only for gas, but applies to electricity net-
works, too.
82. See Energy Communication, supra note 4, at 10 (for the fora of Florence and
Madrid).
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the generator and the off-take point of his customer.8 3 The
Commission objected to the so-called distance component of the
German tariff because the path for the physical delivery of elec-
trons in densely meshed networks is not determined by the indi-
vidual contract path between the generator and his customer.
In this regard electrons are not comparable to other goods.
They do not travel like coal, for instance, but obey the "law of
the least resistance." A dominant network operator charging a
tariff on the basis of an erroneous parallel to other goods is com-
mitting an abuse within the meaning of Article 82 because his
tariff charge is not related to the actual cost incurred. Moreover,
the distance component discriminates in favor of generators in
the vicinity of consumers. The Commission therefore had seri-
ous doubts whether the German tariff was compatible with the
Community competition rules.84
German network operators decided subsequently to abolish
the distance component and introduced a non-transaction-based
tariff. The price for transmissions depended now on the con-
sumption of each individual consumer. This held at least for
transmissions within a newly created Northern and Southern
zone in Germany. Exports and imports as well as domestic trans-
missions from one zone into another, however, were charged an
additional price, called "t-component." The Commission ob-
jected again because of the discrimination of exports and im-
ports as well as certain domestic long-distance transmissions. It
regarded the t-component as arbitrary and therefore not cost-
reflective as required for dominant firms in accordance with Ar-
ticle 82.85
It is not the aim of the Commission to require a uniform
tariff without any locational component for all electricity trans-
missions within Europe. However, tariffs of dominant network
operators for the transport of electricity should be in line with
the laws of physics and, accordingly, the actual cost incurred in
83. Germany is the only Member State with a negotiated TPA system for electricity
transmissions. Industry associations have therefore been negotiating tariffs and terms
for electricity transmissions. The so-called association agreement is, however, not com-
pulsory for individual network operators.
84. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXVII REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 156-59 (1998); Levasseur, Dueloppements les plus rdcents, 3 COMPETITION
POL'Y NEWSL. 43-46 (1998).
85. The t-component was later dropped for inter-zonal transmissions as a condi-
tion for the approval of the VEBA/VIAG merger. See VEGA/V7AG, supra note 42.
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the network that is used for transmission. The Commission is
therefore of the opinion that tarification systems should not be
based on the individual commercial transaction between a sup-
plier and his customer. Instead of being "transaction-based,"
charges should relate to the connection or network access. Fur-
thermore, for cross-border transmissions "pancaking" should be
avoided. Pancaking occurs, if each country located between a
supplier and his customer imposes a charge for the transmission
through its grid. This would seriously impede trade between
Member States. The Commission is therefore opposed to any
additional charge for exports or imports of electricity. It favors a
system where network operators compensate each other for the
cost of transmissions in their networks. The compensation
mechanism should be based on the actual net physical flow of
electricity between networks within a certain period of time.
The network hosting such flows should be remunerated by the
network causing such flows. 86 The users of the network causing
the flows should indirectly, but ultimately have to bear the cost
for cross-border transmissions. Competition policy could not in-
troduce such a system. However, it should be considered
whether it could be created by internal market policy.87
B. Dealing with Congestion
The other major network issue of EC competition policy
apart from tarification has been congestion management.
Electricity networks have been built in the past to serve a
national, not a European market. Before liberalization almost
all of the electricity produced in the fifteen Member States was
also consumed in each of these countries. Approximately eight
percent of total Community production has been traded be-
tween Member States.8 This situation changes through market
opening. The existing significant price differences between na-
tional markets provide a strong incentive for cross-border trade.
It has already been pointed out how important import competi-
tion is for the improvement of the prevailing supply structure in
86. See Energy Communication, supra note 4, at 11.
87. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
on Conditions for Access to the Network for Cross-border Exchanges in Electricity,
COM (2001) 125/4; Conclusions of the 7th Forum of Electricity Regulators at Florence
in February 2002.
88. See Energy Communication, supra note 4, at 9.
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many Member States.8 9
The European network infrastructure, however, has to be
substantially improved to allow trade to grow and import compe-
tition to have a substantial impact on the market conduct of in-
cumbent suppliers. Many lines connecting the distinct grids of
Member States have quickly become congested after market
opening. Transmission system operators are introducing special
procedures for the allocation of bottleneck capacity because de-
mand for cross-border transmissions has become constantly
higher than supply. The procedures most frequently applied are
auctions, pro rata rationing, and "first come, first served."9
Auctions have been criticized because they allow network
operators to gain windfall profits on top of their regular trans-
mission income. The additional revenue for the use of the bot-
tleneck facility tends to equal the difference between the average
prices for electricity in the exporting and importing Member
State. Import competition is thus likely to be deprived of most
of its procompetitive impact on high-price markets. A vertically
integrated supplier and network operator may thus benefit not
only from his dominant position on the national supply market,
but also from his auction income that is likely to be influenced
by the national price level mainly determined by him. Auction-
ing of bottleneck capacity has therefore been criticized as an
abuse of a dominant position.
It is true that pro rata rationing of transmission requests and
the allocation of capacity in accordance with the timely order in
which requests arrive keep the price for transmission lower and
allow imports to exercise a stronger constraint on electricity
prices in the import market. Both allocation methods suffer,
however, also from certain weaknesses. Pro rata rationing does
not function effectively when demand massively surpasses sup-
ply. The capacity attributed to each individual request may be-
89. See supra subsection III.A.
90. The Scandinavian Members States organized an electricity market that encom-
passes all their previously national markets and introduced a market splitting mecha-
nism. This means that as a reaction to the occurrence of congestion, there will be
different market prices on either side of the bottleneck. Thus, electricity in the area
that is oversupplied becomes cheaper than electricity in the undersupplied area. Con-
sequently market participants are relatively less interested in purchasing from the area
that becomes more expensive and the resulting flow over the bottleneck is reduced. See
Commission of the European Communities, Second Report to the Council and the
European Parliament on Harmonization Requirements, COM (1999) 164 Final, at 37.
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come so small that it is no longer commercially interesting. The
allocation of capacity on the basis of "first come, first served"
lacks transparency and increases significantly the risk of discrimi-
nation, if the allocating network operator has himself export in-
terests.
In contrast, the auctioning of scarce transmission capacity is
a transparent allocation method, operational under all demand
conditions. It provides price signals to market participants and
should permit the lowest cost supplier to obtain transmission
rights. Auctioning thus does not constitute by itself an abuse of
the dominant position of the interconnector operator. Regular
auctions generate, however, additional income for the operator.
Collecting the additional income as a profit may therefore be
abusive, if proceeds are not used to reinforce the transmission
capacity of a constantly congested bottleneck facility or to re-
duce the cost of cross-border transmissions for exporters.91
Congestion is at some borders further aggravated by the
transmission capacity permanently reserved for large import
contracts that have been concluded before liberalization. These
long-term contracts reduce the technically already limited capac-
ity even further, which is available for new entrants. The Com-
mission is currently investigating the import contracts and capac-
ity reservations that incumbent operators enjoy at the most con-
gested borders between Member States. To grant priority rights
to transmissions of former monopolists may constitute discrimi-
nation and thus is an abuse of the dominant position of the allo-
cating interconnector operator. The Commission will, of
course, consider objective justifications for alleged priority
rights, in particular if the parties to an import contract have
made investments in order to execute their agreement that have
not yet been amortized.
Some import contracts pre-dating liberalization have al-
ready been modified by the parties while the Commission was
investigating them. A long-term contract for the transmission of
electricity between Norway and Germany via Denmark has, for
instance, been changed to the effect that the full capacity of the
line is now open to third parties. 2 Similarly, the interconnector
91. See supra subsection III.A.
92. See EU COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT, XXXTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 155-
56 (2000); Press Release, EU Commission, Increased Scope for Electricity Import Corn-
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between France and the UK has been made available for all mar-
ket participants because the parties previously using the full
transmission capacity of the submarine cable decided not to ex-
tend their existing reservation contract.93
All measures taken to make the best use of the existing
cross-border transmission capacity, however, cannot hide the
fact that significant investments are necessary to adapt the Euro-
pean network infrastructure to the requirements of competitive,
Community-wide supply markets. Fifteen national network sys-
tems have to be transformed into a Trans-European network.94
To increase the capacity of an existing interconnector or to
build a new link between networks that have been operating in
isolation from each other in the past will therefore normally be
procompetitive. The Commission encourages such investments.
Competition problems may arise, however, if third parties are
restricted in the use of new transmission capacity.
The Commission intervened in the case of a new intercon-
nector where the TSO originally granted a power supplier prior-
ity rights for up to 100% of the available transmission capacity
for fifteen years. The reservation had been concluded some
years before the adoption of the Electricity Directive and had
therefore not been awarded in an open and transparent proce-
dure. The network operator, who is solely responsible for the
construction of the new link between previously not intercon-
nected grids, received funds from the European Community for
the project. The Commission regarded the long-term reserva-
tion as excessive in terms both of capacity utilization and dura-
tion even when considering that it concerned a new submarine
cable. After discussions with the competent national regulatory
authority, the parties informed the Commission of modifications
to their agreement reducing the reserved capacity utilization to
fifty percent for the duration of less than six years. This enabled
the Commission to approve the modified agreement.
Even the reservation of the full capacity of a new line for the
petition in Northern Europe-A Step Forward Towards an Internal Market for Electric-
ity, IP/01/30 (Jan. 1, 2001).
93. See Press Release, EU Commission, UK/France Interconnector Opens Up, In-
creasing Scope for Competition, IP/01/341 (Mar. 12, 2001).
94. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council, European Energy Infrastructure, COM(2001) (Dec. 20, 2001), available at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/energy/library/commu-infra-en.pdf.
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constructing parties may be compatible, however, with Commu-
nity competition law, where the already existing interconnector
capacity satisfies market demand for transmissions for the fore-
seeable future."
C. Cooperation with National Regulators
The creation of an open access regime for networks also
constitutes a very good example of the close cooperation of the
Commission with sector-specific regulatory authorities that most
Member States specifically set up for the liberalized electricity
and gas markets. The collaboration within the regulatory fora of
Florence and Madrid where Community and national authori-
ties meet to discuss cross-border transmission issues has already
been mentioned. Another area of cooperation concerns the
treatment of individual network access cases. The Directives pro-
vide that Member States empower their energy regulators with
the authority to deal expeditiously with disputes concerning
third-party access. 9 6 Community competition law and sector-spe-
cific regulation97 will therefore very often apply in parallel in ac-
cess cases, in particular if they concern access to cross-border
lines. Multiple proceedings might lead, however, to unnecessary
duplication of investigative efforts by the Commission and na-
tional authorities. In order to avoid such duplication, the Com-
mission and national competition authorities have developed
certain principles for the allocation of cases. It has been agreed,
for instance, that the Commission should concentrate its en-
forcement efforts on cases having a particular political, eco-
nomic, or legal significance for the Community.98 It seems ap-
propriate that this general principle applies also to the energy
sector as it does with regard to other liberalized sectors. 99 More-
over, it has to be taken into account that national authorities
have been especially called upon by the Community legislator to
95. See Commission Notice, O.J. C 247/11 (2001), art. 19(3) (publication of the
Viking Cable project).
96. See Electricity Directive, supra note 1, art. 20; Gas Directive, supra note 2, art.
21.
97. In some Member States national competition law may apply instead of sector-
specific regulation.
98. See Commission Notice, OJ. C 313/3, at 3 (1997) (on cooperation between
national competition authorities and the Commission).
99. See Commission Notice, O.J. C 265/2, paras. 6, 18 (1998) (on the application
of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector).
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deal with access disputes. It would therefore also appear to be
reasonable that the Commission does not tackle access disputes
with priority while there are related actions before a relevant na-
tional authority or court.'00 This seems even more justified in
view of the duty of national authorities not to approve any prac-
tice or agreement contrary to Community competition law.10 1
This obligation has explicitly been confirmed for the electricity
and gas sector by the Directives. 10 2 The Commission thus does
not have to intervene itself in every case in order to protect the
Community rule of law and ensure a level playing field in the
European electricity and gas markets. At the same time, case
allocation and close cooperation between the Community and
national instances should lead to a mutual reinforcement of
both sets of rules through the close cooperation of all authorities
involved.
It depends very much on the development of functioning
transmission markets whether consumers can actually switch sup-
pliers and whether suppliers can genuinely compete against
each other. The Commission and national authorities make a
combined effort to support the development of cost-reflective
tariffs and proper congestion management on the basis of the
Community competition rules and sector-specific regulation. It
appears however that additional legislative measures as proposed
by the Commission in the draft Acceleration Directive and Regu-
lation on access conditions for electricity networks are indispen-
sable to succeed in effectively open up networks.
V. PUBLIC SERVICE OBLIGATIONS AND COMPETITIVE
ENERGY MARKETS
The provision of public services has always been a character-
istic feature of the European electricity and gas industries. In
order to ensure that the supply of electricity and gas responds
best to the needs of consumers, large Member States tradition-
ally impose obligations on suppliers to that effect. Such obliga-
tions can be grouped generally into three categories: security of
100. See id. para. 28.
101. Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line Reisebfiro GmbH v. Zentrale zur
Bekdmpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs, Case 66/86, [1989] E.C.R. 803, 838.
102. See Electricity Directive, supra note 1, art. 22; Gas Directive, supra note 2, art.
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supply, protection of the environment, and maintenance of ser-
vice standards.
Before liberalization the provision of public services had
been ensured through State ownership of energy enterprises or
via sector-specific regulation. The opening of the electricity and
gas markets for Community-wide competition created many con-
cerns, mainly on the side of the beneficiaries of the previous
market organization, as to the future of these services and their
quality. Potential entrants in the liberalized markets, on the
other hand, fear that enterprises entrusted with public service
obligations will be granted special rights or public funds, which
give them an unfair advantage in the competition for customers.
The liberalization of energy markets and the provision of
public services neither exclude each other, nor are both objec-
tives necessarily in conflict with each other. The Directives'are a
clear demonstration of this. They require Member States to
open up their markets for all European competitors and, at the
same time, confirm the existence of public services.' 3 They
leave the freedom of Member States to introduce public services
untouched and intact. Some public services typical for both en-
ergy sectors are even mentioned in the Directives, for example,
the obligation of distributors to connect and supply all consum-
ers in a given area,' °4 or the duty of network operators to give
priority to environmentally friendly or indigenous fuel-using
power installations when dispatching generating installations. 0 5
The Directives also rule how the competition and public ser-
vice objectives can co-exist with each other. Both refer to the EC
Treaty and in particular to Article 86(2). This means mainly
that, if Member States wish to maintain or create new public ser-
vices, they have to define and explicitly entrust enterprises with
such a mission. It no longer suffices to instruct State-owned
companies to perform public services. Furthermore, any restric-
tion of competition introduced by a Member State in order to
support the performance of a public service must not exceed
what is necessary to guarantee effective fulfillment of the mis-
103. See Electricity Directive, supra note 1, art. 3(2); Gas Directive, supra note 2,
art. 3(2).
104. See Electricity Directive, supra note 1, art. 10(1); Gas Directive, supra note 2,
art. 9(2).
105. See Electricity Directive, supra note 1, art. 8(3)-(4).
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sion. 10 6 The grant of special or exclusive rights to one or a lim-
ited number of enterprises has to be proportionate to the public
service mission with which they have been entrusted. A Member
State having the intention to uphold any of the existing monop-
oly rights in the electricity or gas sector and thus not implement-
ing all of the key requirements for the creation of competitive
Community-wide markets must notify the Commission of this
plan.1 °7 The fact that to date no Member State has found it nec-
essary to derogate from any of these key requirements after liber-
alization1"8 demonstrates in practice that in the electricity and
gas sectors competition and public services are compatible with
each other.
This will not change when liberalization progresses and all
consumers including all households can freely choose among
suppliers. The Commission itself proposes in the draft Accelera-
tion Directive to combine full market opening with the compul-
sory introduction of a number of public service obligations in
the interest of final consumers. Among these are transparency
requirements and low-cost dispute settlement mechanisms.1 0 9
Additional minimum service standards as well as other public
services can be secured through sector-specific regulation, the
observation of which is monitored by regulatory authorities.
Even the obligation to supply electricity at affordable and rea-
sonable prices to final consumers110 can be guaranteed without
maintaining existing supply monopolies. The total exclusion of
competition in order to guarantee low prices for a particular
group of consumers would seem to be disproportionate and not
compatible with Article 86(2). Instead of maintaining monopo-
lies, one consideration is to involve energy suppliers in financing
the net extra cost of the universal service through a system of
additional charges or a public service fund. Alternatively, State
aid could cover the cost of the public service.11 Prices re-
106. See Commission Communication on Services of General Interest in Europe,
O.J. C 17/4, at 8, paras. 22-23 (2001). The term services of general interest covers
market and non-market services that the public authorities classify as being of general
interest and object to specific public service obligations. See id. at 23, Annex II.
107. See Electricity Directive, supra note 1, art. 3; Gas Directive, supra note 2, art. 3.
108. See Energy Communication, supra note 4, at 19.
109. See Acceleration Directive, supra note 9, new art. 3(3).
110. As being proposed by the Commission in the draft Acceleration Directive. See
Acceleration Directive, supra note 9, new art. 3(3).
111. See Energy Communication, supra note 4, paras. 15, 26.
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present, however, one of the principal areas upon which electric-
ity suppliers compete, as the example of some fully liberalized
markets shows. The introduction of genuine EC-wide competi-
tion may thus indeed be the best mechanism to improve the
quality of services also for final consumers. 12
CONCLUSION
The EU has successfully launched the liberalization of the
electricity and gas markets. The creation of an internal energy
market forms an important part of the Lisbon strategy for eco-
nomic reform of the European Council.1 l A new legal frame-
work for a new competition-oriented market order is now in
place. The economic transition process of the electricity and gas
industries from monopoly to competition has begun in all fif-
teen Member States and is irreversible. We are already in the
third year of electricity liberalization and the second year of gas
liberalization.
It is also true, however, that the difficulties of the transition
become more visible as the process advances. Transmission mar-
kets are beginning to work but only imperfectly. Competition
between suppliers is emerging but has been hampered by the
many advantages of incumbents, in particular those owning a
network. Some new entrants are already withdrawing from the
newly opened markets. Prices show a tendency to increase again
after a period of price reductions. The "California experience"
or, the "accident waiting to happen," '114 raised concerns about
the new regulatory environment. Moreover, the political climate
appears to be no longer as favorable for liberalization after the
failure of the European Council in Stockholm in March 2001 to
agree on a definite date for full market opening.1 15 The contin-
uing imbalances in market opening and the public perception
that some State-owned companies are taking advantage of the
112. See Commission Communication, supra note 106, at 22, Annex I.
113. See Lisbon European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL., no.
3, para. 17 (2000).
114. Paul L. Joskow, California's Electricity Market Meltdown, Working Paper, MIT
Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (Sept. 28, 2001), at 29, available
at http://web.mit.edu/ceepr/www/2001-006.pdf.
115. See Stockholm European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL.,
no. 3, para. 17 (2001).
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uneven liberalization further contributed to the negative devel-
opment of the political climate.
The difficulties of the transition process must be taken seri-
ously, but they can be overcome. The Acceleration Directive
proposed by the Commission already deals with the imperfec-
tions of the first Directives. It suggests apart from rapid and full
market opening additional qualitative measures like further un-
bundling of networks and the compulsory introduction of regu-
lated third-party access in order to create a more level playing
field for all market participants. Furthermore, Community com-
petition policy will continue to support the liberalization process
with all its instruments. The Commission will continue to en-
force the competition rules against restrictive practices, market
power increasing mergers, and distorting State aid. It will act in
close cooperation with the national competition and regulatory
authorities in order to enhance the effectiveness of the competi-
tion as well as the new sector-specific rules.
Moreover, it should be noted that the European Council is
still fully committed to the objective of market opening. The
Council failed in Stockholm to agree on a date for full market
opening but did not fail to underline once again the importance
of energy liberalization for the modernization of European in-
dustry and decided in March 2002 in Barcelona as a next step
that all European non-household consumers shall enjoy free-
dom of choice of suppliers as of 2004 for electricity and gas. Fur-
thermore, the governments of the fifteen Member States ex-
pressed their full support for the vigorous application of the
competition rules against all obstacles to the internal energy
market.11 6
Finally and most importantly, European consumers will con-
tinue to press for further liberalization. Even the only emerging
competition on European electricity and gas markets has already
demonstrated to their satisfaction that consumer choice signifi-
cantly increases and supply offerings substantially improve
through competition and the creation of Community-wide mar-
kets. After all, it should be the consumer that counts, shouldn't
it?
116. See Stockholm European Council, supra note 115; Barcelona European Coun-
cil, Conclusions of the Presidency, para. 37, available at http://europa.eu.int/council/
off/conclu/.
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ANNEX*
EU Electricity Market Opening
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
EU-Average
2000
32%
35%
90%
100%
30%
100%
30%
30%
35%
40%
33%
30%
54%
100%
100%
66%
2003
100% (2001)
50%
100%
100%
35%
100%
35%
40%
70%
+56%
100%
35%
100%
100%
100%
75%
EU Gas Market Opening
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
EU-Average
2000
49%
58.7%
30%
90%
20%
100%
0%
75%
96%
51.1%
45%
0%
72%
47%
100%
78,9%
* Extract from Commission Staff Working Paper,
market, SEC(2001) 438.
Completing the internal energy
(2007)
(2005)
(2005)
Later
100%
100%
100%
100%
n.a.
100%
n .a.
100%
70%
75%
100%
n.a.
100%
100%
100%
83%
2008
100%
100%
43%
90%
33%
100%
33%
100%
100%
83.4%
100%
33%
100%
100%
100%
91,5%
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